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TIME, DUE PROCESS, AND REPRESENTATION:
AN EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
CONTINUANCES IN IMMIGRATION COURT
David Hausman* & Jayashri Srikantiah**
Since 2014, U.S. immigration courts have expedited the cases of many
children and families fleeing persecution in Mexico and Central America.
This Article conducts an empirical and legal analysis of this policy,
revealing that reasonable time between immigration court hearings is
necessary to protect the statutory and constitutional rights to legal
representation. A large majority of immigrants facing deportation—
including those part of the recent surge of children and families from
Central America and Mexico—appear at their first deportation hearing
without a lawyer, often because they cannot afford one.
When an immigrant appears without a lawyer and does not expressly
waive his or her right to counsel, the immigration judge (IJ) must grant a
continuance that allows a reasonable period of time for an immigrant to
search for and retain counsel. Yet existing law does not specify what
period of time is reasonable, and the courts of appeals disagree over how
closely to scrutinize an IJ’s decision to deny a continuance.
In this Article, we use schedule data from the Executive Office for
Immigration Review to show that the length of a continuance has a large
effect on immigrants’ likelihood of finding counsel, of appearing at
subsequent hearings, and of eventually avoiding removal. Our analysis
demonstrates that shorter continuances for unrepresented children and
families prevented many from finding counsel and avoiding deportation. In
light of these findings, we examine the due process and statutory
consequences of an IJ’s decision to deny a continuance or to grant an
overly short continuance. We conclude by recommending that initial
continuances of fewer than ninety days should be presumptively invalid.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 2014, at the height of the recent surge of Central American
children’s border crossings, Juan P. Osuna, the director of the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), announced new policies for children
and families in deportation proceedings: the immigration courts would
prioritize the cases of both unaccompanied children and families with
children.1 In the announcement, Osuna stated that EOIR had added a newly
prioritized docket in immigration courts across the country.2 Under the
directive, immigration judges (IJ) were instructed to give expedited
consideration to priority docket cases.3 Osuna’s announcement meant that the
over 57,000 cases4 involving unaccompanied children and families with
children5 would be placed at the head of the line in immigration court.
Under this directive, priority cases were to be heard even more quickly
than those of immigrants detained during the pendency of removal
proceedings. Usually, immigration courts prioritize detained cases to
prevent unnecessary time spent in detention. Before the new priority
dockets, detained cases were the ones with the highest priority and were
resolved quickly—typically in well under a year.6 The slowest-moving
1. See Challenges at the Border: Examining the Causes, Consequences, and
Responses to the Rise in Apprehensions at the Southern Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 3 (July 9, 2014) (statement
of Juan P. Osuna, Dir. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Exec. Office for Immigration Review)
[hereinafter Osuna Directive], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/
witnesses/attachments/2015/02/05/07-09-14-eoir-osuna-testimony-re-challenges-at-theborder-examining-the-.pdf [perma.cc/QQA8-ZF4Y]. For more information on the Central
American refugee crisis, see Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving
Central America and Mexico and the Need for International Protection, U.N. HIGH COMM.
FOR REFUGEES, http://unhcrwashington.org/children (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
[perma.cc/SNP8-VEJ7].
2. See Osuna Directive, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. See infra Table 1.
5. In the immigration context, these include all respondents up to the age of twentyone. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) defines a child as an unmarried
person under twenty-one. INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2012).
6. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2015) (noting mean case durations of 146
and twenty-three days for represented and unrepresented detained cases, respectively).
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cases in immigration courts, by contrast, are those of individuals who are
not detained and not on a priority docket. Those cases regularly last several
years—years longer than newly prioritized but otherwise similar children’s
and families’ cases.7
In this Article, we show that the priority dockets announced by Osuna
had an important side effect: they prevented many immigrants from finding
lawyers. Because immigration proceedings are classified as civil, rather
than criminal, the federal government has long insisted that immigrants
have no right to a government-provided lawyer, regardless of whether they
are adults or children.8 Many immigrants facing deportation lack the
savings to hire a private lawyer immediately after proceedings begin.
Instead, they are only able to save for and engage a lawyer (or find someone
to represent them for free) if they have months before a final hearing in
court. Osuna’s directive, expediting Central American migrants’ cases,
forced thousands of immigrants to move forward with their proceedings
before they were able to retain a lawyer.9
Part I shows that different immigration courts and judges within each
court varied in how strictly they implemented Osuna’s directive. We take
advantage of that variation to estimate just how much difference a longer
continuance makes to an immigrant’s ability to retain an attorney. Using
data obtained by a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from EOIR,
we find that increasing the time between the first and second hearing from
one to two months doubled children’s and families’ chances of finding a
lawyer.
This empirical finding suggests that the current doctrine is inadequate
and leads directly to doctrinal recommendations. Part II summarizes the
state of the law: because immigrants who lack lawyers and are swiftly
deported rarely appeal, the case law on continuance length is not well
developed. In Part III, reasoning from our findings and from the statutory
and constitutional rights to counsel, we propose that, for immigrants
without lawyers, an initial continuance of at least ninety days should be
presumptively required. This recommendation reflects our result that the
chance of finding a lawyer increases most steeply during this first ninetyday period. Finally, we also suggest that EOIR, which provided the
database that we analyze, could perform this analysis for each immigration
court annually, providing a more narrowly tailored presumption that reflects
7. See id. (noting a mean case duration of over 600 days for represented nondetained
respondents).
8. See, e.g., Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 5–8,
J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (No. 2:14-cv-01026).
9. At the same time that Osuna announced the expedited docket, he also announced
funding for lawyers to represent unaccompanied children. See Osuna Directive, supra note
1, at 3. These approximately 100 attorneys have played an important role, but they have
been limited to the representation of unaccompanied children under sixteen, leaving families
and older children with the need to seek representation. See Justice AmeriCorps Legal
Services for Unaccompanied Children, CORP. FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV.,
http://www.nationalservice.gov/build-your-capacity/grants/funding-opportunities/2014/
justice-americorps-legal-services#FAQs (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [perma.cc/75LDYA2H].
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local conditions (and that might result in longer continuances in certain
immigration courts).
These findings and recommendations fit within a growing literature and
advocacy on immigrants’ access to counsel. For example, a pathbreaking
program in New York City recently secured funding for publicly funded
representation for all detained immigrants facing deportation in New York
City’s immigration court,10 and other states and cities have considered
providing similar funding.11 Further, a recent class action lawsuit secured
access to representation for some mentally disabled immigrants in
detention,12 and a currently pending suit seeks government-provided
representation for children facing deportation.13 We call attention to an
understudied piece of this puzzle: the time needed to secure representation.
I. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS:
HOW CONTINUANCES MATTER IN PRACTICE
For children and families who are not detained during their removal
proceedings, more time before a final hearing means more time in the
country, more time to find a lawyer, and a better chance of winning the
right to stay in the United States. Of the over 57,000 children and their
family members whose cases the Obama Administration prioritized, 14
percent began their immigration proceedings with a lawyer and 44 percent
found a lawyer by the time of their second hearing.14 Most families and
children who found lawyers found them after their first court appearance.15

10. See New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, VERA INST. JUST.,
http://www.vera.org/project/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project (last visited Mar. 27,
2016) (describing the project, a public defender program for detained immigrants facing
deportation in New York City’s immigration court) [perma.cc/XLT6-V2R3]; see also
STEERING COMM. OF THE N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY REPORT, ACCESSING
JUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
(2011), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Accessing%20Justice.pdf (report providing basis for
funding for representation in New York) [perma.cc/7LSR-E8EP].
11. See, e.g., San Francisco Allocates $2.1M to Legal Aid for Unaccompanied Minors,
Families Facing Deportation, CBS SF BAY AREA (Sept. 16, 2014), http://
sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/09/16/san-francisco-allocates-2-1m-to-legal-aid-forunaccompanied-minors-families-facing-deportation-david-campos-central-america-elsalvador-guatemala-honduras-mexico-undocumented [perma.cc/MH4Q-ALQ2].
12. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10–02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL
3674492, at *16, *20 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (entering permanent injunction).
13. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction, J.E.F.M., 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (No. 2:14cv-01026-TSZ) [hereinafter J.E.F.M. Motion for Preliminary Injunction].
14. See infra Table 1. All data reflect the state of the immigration courts’ database on
April 30, 2015, when the data for our most recent FOIA request was extracted. For these
summary statistics, we consider all children and families whose cases were expedited but
who were not detained—those marked “UC” (unaccompanied child) or “AWC/ATD” (adults
with children/alternatives to detention) in the immigration court’s database. A small number
of these cases—under 10 percent—are marked as initially detained, so the vast majority are
never detained. For the analysis below, which considers the effect of time before the group
of 100 Justice America lawyers began its work, see supra note 9, we consider only cases that
had their first hearing between August 1, 2014, and January 1, 2015.
15. See infra Table 1.
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The more time they had between hearings, the more likely they were to find
a lawyer.16
Immigration proceedings start with a scheduling hearing called a master
calendar hearing. Immigrants sit on benches in the back of the courtroom,
and the judge calls them one by one for a short colloquy. When immigrants
come to their first hearing without a lawyer (as most do), the IJ tells them
that they have a right to lawyer at their own expense.17 Then the IJ offers a
continuance to give each immigrant time to look for a lawyer.18 A long
wait means more time in the country and, therefore, more time to save up
for a paid lawyer or to find a nonprofit or pro bono attorney.
Why does more time make a difference? First, immigrants often do not
have enough money saved to pay an attorney immediately. Full
representation in immigration court can cost several thousand dollars.
Gathering the money may require saving over months, together with
support from friends and family and other forms of loans.19 Second,
finding a lawyer may not be easy even with some money saved up. For
example, an attorney who frequently volunteers on the priority docket in
San Francisco’s immigration court points out that even reaching
immigration attorneys may be difficult, simply because many lawyers are
busy: “I explain that you should space out the calls and always leave a
message, including your phone number. I explain that lawyers often don’t
call back, but you need to fight for yourself and you need to do these
things.”20 These combined obstacles—lack of resources and lack of
information about removal proceedings—make time important for finding
counsel.
IJs give some immigrants more time than they give others. Some of
these differences in wait times reflect random scheduling decisions—an IJ
often assigns immigrants in first master calendar hearings to one of several
dates, some of which are later than others and some of which may be more
convenient for assuring the presence of an interpreter. But the court
database also shows that immigration courts vary in how strict they are with
extensions. Some IJs, and some courts, tend to give several continuances
with six months or more between hearings; others give only one or two
continuances with only a month or two between hearings.21

16. See infra Figure 2.
17. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)–(3) (2015).
18. See IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.15(g) (2009), http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/02/02/practice_manual_review.pdf
[perma.cc/4BJPYELA].
19. The literature on how poor households finance large medical expenses documents
such coping strategies. When households are able to gather the money to pay for such large
expenses, they often fall further into poverty. See, e.g., Gabriela Flores et al., Coping with
Health-Care Costs: Implications for the Measurement of Catastrophic Expenditures and
Poverty, 17 HEALTH ECON. 1393, 1393–95 (2008) (summarizing literature on coping with
health expenses).
20. Telephone Interview with Att’y Courtney McDermed (June 15, 2015).
21. See infra Figure 1.
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When Osuna announced the expedited children’s docket in July 2014, IJs
reacted: the median first continuance dropped from ninety-four to seventyeight days.22 This change mattered. The policy of expediting hearings
shortened many continuances enough to prevent children and families from
finding lawyers.
Even after the nationwide decision to expedite, the length of
continuances varied from court to court, from IJ to IJ, and from immigrant
to immigrant, allowing us to estimate the importance of continuance length.
Figure 1 shows average continuance lengths for children and families who
came to their first hearing without lawyers at the immigration courts that
heard at least 1000 expedited cases between August 1, 2014, and January 1,
2015.23 Different courts adopted widely different policies: the average first
continuance in Chicago (over 150 days) was three times longer than in
Atlanta (under fifty days).24 In our regression analysis below, we control
for differences across courts (and IJs) to measure the effect of less time on
case outcomes, but initially, we present these cross-court differences to
illustrate the degree of variation in continuance length.

22. More precisely, the median first continuance length for nondetained and released
juvenile cases with a first hearing in 2013 was ninety-four days; the median first continuance
for unaccompanied children and families with children between August 1, 2014, and January
1, 2015, (the period in which cases were most expedited) was seventy-eight days.
23. These averages exclude continuances of longer than 200 days, which make up fewer
than 20 percent of all continuances. These longer continuances often reflect a different
dynamic at work; for example, a judge may adjourn a case in order to give a child time to
file an application for asylum with U.S. Customs and Immigration Services. Although we
did not drop them, very short continuances may also occasionally reflect a different
dynamic; for example, if an immigrant or lawyer is unable to appear on short notice and
informs the court, sometimes a hearing may be rescheduled quickly.
24. See infra Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Average Continuance Length
by Court for Priority Docket Cases

Table 1 illustrates the time dynamic in priority docket cases; with each
hearing, more and more immigrants are represented, but there are fewer and
fewer respondents. This attrition reflects both the fact that many
immigrants are ordered deported at their first and second hearings and that
many immigrants have not yet appeared for their second or third hearing,
because these cases began recently.25

25. In order to identify when a respondent first had a lawyer, we used the earliest of
three dates: (1) the EOIR-28 date, which is not always recorded when a lawyer is present
but reflects the date when the lawyer first formally entered an appearance, (2) the first date
on which an Alien Attorney Code is recorded in the schedule table, and (3) the first date on
which an EOIR Attorney ID is recorded in the EOIR schedule table. Sometimes the EOIR28 date is updated when attorneys enter subsequent appearances; that should not affect our
results, because we use the first of these three measures.
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Table 1: Representation Over Time
for Children and Families on Priority Dockets

Percentage with
Lawyer
Number with
Lawyer
Total

First
Hearing

Second
Hearing

Third
Hearing

14%

44%

64%

8,154

14,705

10,132

57,410

33,420

15,948

Source: EOIR CASE Database, Never Detained Priority Children’s and Family Cases.

These differences do not just speed cases up or slow them down. They
also change IJs’ decisions: more time means a better chance of finding a
lawyer. In order to estimate this effect reliably, we rely on a key fact about
the first master calendar hearing: IJs grant a first continuance as a matter of
course.26 In other words, at the first hearing, children without lawyers are
always granted a continuance, and judges do not address the merits before
granting that continuance. We therefore need not worry that the merits of
the cases explain the effects that we find.
Those effects are large. Figure 2 considers children and families who
arrived in immigration court without a lawyer and shows that the more days
that elapse before a second hearing, the more likely that the child or family
will have a lawyer at that second hearing.27 This figure includes all cases
marked by EOIR as unaccompanied children or adults with children on
alternatives to detention; less than 10 percent of these cases began with
detention. Moving from a one-month to a two-month continuance nearly
doubles the chance of finding a lawyer, from just over 20 percent to nearly
40 percent.28 The effect levels off over time: after 100 days, longer
continuances make a smaller difference, though still a significant one.29

26. See infra note 36 (describing regulations and the practice manual governing
immigration judges’ grants of continuances to seek representation).
27. Note that the database marks cases as “adults with children” and does not distinguish
between the adults and the children in these groups.
28. See infra Figure 2.
29. See infra Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Continuance Length and Representation
for Priority Docket Cases
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Given the importance of time for finding a lawyer, it should come as no
surprise that longer continuances also give children and families a better
chance of winning the right to remain in the United States. Figure 3 shows
the effect of more time on the chance of deportation at the second hearing.30
These estimates are necessarily incomplete: most immigration proceedings
do not end at the second hearing.31 Still, there is a distinct pattern that
resembles the effect of time on finding a lawyer: more time helps,
especially at the beginning.32

30. For simplicity, we count voluntary departure as deportation. Even though it carries
different legal consequences, it requires the immigrant to leave the United States.
31. A few proceedings also end at the first hearing.
32. See infra Figure 3.
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Proportion Deported if Decision at Second Hearing

Figure 3: Continuance Length and Deportation
for Priority Docket Cases 2
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So far, we have shown that the amount of time that IJs grant between the
first and second hearings—a routine determination that does not reflect the
merits of cases, but does vary across judges and courts—is highly
correlated with legal representation and outcomes at the second hearing.
One may wonder, however, whether these results simply reflect differing
caseloads across immigration courts and judges: perhaps some IJs both
grant more time and help immigrants find lawyers in other ways. To
account for that possibility, we verify the results in Figures 2 and 3 with
regressions that employ fixed effects at the IJ level. These fixed effects
control for variation caused by both IJs and courts; because IJs generally
work in one court, there is little need for court fixed effects in addition. The
results, shown in Tables 2 and 3 below, are very similar to those in the
figures: holding caseload and judge constant, more time leads to a better
chance of finding a lawyer and avoiding deportation. In other words, even
looking at one judge at a time, immigrants granted longer continuances are
significantly more likely to find representation and avoid deportation. As in
these figures, the effect of more time is strongest in comparisons between
relatively short continuances.
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Table 2: Effect of Continuance Length
on Representation at Second Hearing

Continuance
Length

Central
American

Intercept
N

(1)
200 Days or
Fewer

(2)
100 Days or
Fewer

(3)
50 Days or
Fewer

0.00187***

0.00282***

0.00371***

(0.000268)

(0.000281)

(0.000628)

0.0613

0.0556

0.00963

(0.0418)

(0.0413)

(0.0335)

0.145**
(0.0440)
26,772

0.104*
(0.0406)
20,085

0.113**
(0.0385)
9,016

Standard errors in parentheses. All models include IJ fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
IJ level. Note that the sample only includes cases with first hearings between August 1, 2014, and
January 1, 2015.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table 3: Effect of Continuance Length
on Deportation Orders at Second Hearing

Continuance
Length

Central
American

Intercept
N

(1)
200 Days or
Fewer

(2)
100 Days or
Fewer

(3)
50 Days or
Fewer

-0.000651**

-0.000554

-0.00120

(0.000199)

(0.000368)

(0.00138)

-0.103*

-0.0938

-0.0129

(0.0465)

(0.0497)

(0.0433)

1.015***
(0.0466)
4,163

1.008***
(0.0510)
3,145

0.973***
(0.0609)
1,782

Standard errors in parentheses. All models include IJ fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
IJ level. Note that the sample only includes cases with first hearings between August 1, 2014, and
January 1, 2015.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

1834

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Although the IJ-fixed effects allow us to be confident that time matters
independent of IJs’ preferences, IJs do also use time to influence outcomes.
Many IJs understand that longer continuances can help immigrants find a
lawyer and successfully apply for relief. The same IJs who are more likely
to order immigrants deported also grant shorter and fewer continuances.33
This pattern holds for children and families: IJs who allow longer
continuances are less likely to have ordered children and families deported
at their second hearing.34
Figure 4, below, shows the results: the longer the average continuance,
the lower the chance of deportation. There are relatively few IJs who have
heard families’ and children’s cases on the priority docket, and those cases
may not have been randomly assigned. Nonetheless, there is good reason to
believe that this relationship is real: it matches similar results from the
adult docket.35

Demeaned Judge Deportation Rate at Second Hearing

Figure 4: Judges’ Deportation Rates
and Continuance Lengths for Priority Docket

.2

0

-.2

-.4
-100

-50
0
Demeaned Judge First Continuance Length

50

33. David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 19–24), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2568960 [https://perma.cc/XVM6-WLPV].
34. To test whether more generous IJs also granted children and families longer
continuances, we look at cases that had a first hearing between August 1, 2014, and January
1, 2015, and that received a continuance of fewer than 150 days. Note that in the previous
regressions, unlike in the figures, we include continuances of up to 200 days; the shorter
length for the figures makes these easier to display, but there is little substantive difference.
We included only IJs who heard at least 200 cases on the priority docket. Next, we
demeaned the average first continuance time by court and also demeaned each IJ’s
deportation rate (at a child or family’s second hearing) by court.
35. See id.
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Finally, the skeptical reader may still wonder whether IJs allow more
time for cases to which they are more sympathetic; perhaps the results
reflect this correlation between sympathy and continuances, rather than the
effect of extra time. That hypothesis, however, does not fit the nature of the
initial hearing before an IJ. When the immigrant appears without a lawyer,
the IJ grants a continuance as a matter of course and usually without a
detailed inquiry into the case.36 This short interaction with the IJ does not
allow time for the IJ to develop a view about the likely merits of the case
and to grant a longer continuance to an immigrant with a more meritorious
case.
In sum, these data offer convincing evidence that continuance length
influences both access to counsel and eventual outcomes in immigration
court. Longer continuances mean fewer deportations.
II. A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO FIND COUNSEL
The U.S. Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965
(INA), and immigration regulations all protect the right to counsel, but case
law has not fully addressed the implications of that right for IJs’ decisions
about continuances. In this part, we describe the origins and contours of the
right to a reasonable time to seek counsel. First, we describe the growing
civil Gideon movement and its accompanying scholarly work. That
movement has focused on the extension of a right to representation to
particularly vulnerable populations—in the immigration context,
unaccompanied children and mentally disabled respondents. We survey
this literature in order to situate our contribution. We describe a
complementary right that cuts across populations of respondents: the right
to a reasonable opportunity, in the form of a reasonable continuance, to
obtain counsel at no expense to the government. This right is not a new
one, but in the absence of data on the effects of longer and shorter
continuances, courts’ focus has been on the grant or denial of a continuance
rather than its length. There is a consensus that the Constitution and INA
protect the right, at least under some circumstances, to a continuance to
seek counsel. The circuits differ, however, on how much deference they
grant an IJ’s denial of a continuance. Moreover, the circuits are split on
whether to require respondents to demonstrate that they were prejudiced by
the denial of a continuance. Finally, and most important for the purposes of
our analysis, neither the courts of appeals nor the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) offer guidance on the length of a reasonable continuance.
Perhaps this lack of guidance helps explain the dramatic variation across IJs
and courts in the average length of a continuance.
Because the courts and the BIA offer little guidance on the scope of the
due process right to a reasonable continuance, we set out a framework for
evaluating the reasonableness of a continuance. That framework explicitly
36. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1) (2015) (requiring immigration judge to inform
respondent of right to counsel at no expense to the government); see also IMMIGRATION
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 18, § 4.15(e).
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acknowledges the need for empirical evidence, a need that is implicit in the
current due process doctrine. The leading doctrinal standards for evaluating
the necessity of additional procedures under the Constitution—the Mathews
v. Eldridge37 test and the related fundamental fairness standard in
immigration law—both require judges (and the Executive) to make
empirical, predictive judgments. We take the additional step of urging that
these decision makers consider systematic empirical evidence when it is
available.
A. Representation for Vulnerable Populations
As advocates and scholars have argued that immigrants facing
deportation should have counsel appointed and paid for by the government,
they have often focused on identifying feasible next steps toward that goal.
Such steps have typically identified some group of immigrants facing
deportation as especially vulnerable.
Perhaps most prominently, two important class actions have sought
government-provided representation for two particularly vulnerable
populations of immigrants facing removal: (1) mentally ill immigrants
who are also detained pending their removal, and (2) children. In FrancoGonzalez v. Holder,38 the plaintiffs secured a permanent injunction
requiring the provision of representation, at government expense, for
mentally ill immigration detainees.39 The plaintiffs prevailed partly on
Rehabilitation Act grounds; the court held that government-provided
counsel was a reasonable accommodation for their mental disability.40 In
other words, the rationale was that mentally ill respondents are especially
unable to represent themselves. The same concern underlies J.E.F.M. v.
Holder,41 in which the plaintiffs sought counsel for children facing removal
proceedings, arguing that children are less able than adults to represent
themselves competently. These concerns also motivated San Francisco’s
funding for representation for unaccompanied children and families facing
deportation.42 Furthermore, scholars have argued persuasively that children
facing a complex legal system are particularly entitled to representation.43
Detention raises similar issues: without free access to communication
and legal resources, immigrants in detention are less able to represent
themselves.44 The New York Family Unity Project recently began
providing representation to all immigrants in New York City who are
detained pending their deportation.45 The project uses a public defender
37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
38. No. CV 10–02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
39. Id. at *20.
40. Id. at *5.
41. 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
42. See supra note 11.
43. See, e.g., Ashley Ham Pong, Humanitarian Protections and the Need for Appointed
Counsel for Unaccompanied Immigrant Children Facing Deportation, 21 WASH. & LEE J.
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 68 (2014).
44. Of course, detention without counsel raises liberty concerns as well.
45. See New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, supra note 10.

2016] ANALYZING CONTINUANCES IN IMMIGRATION COURT

1837

model, with some attorneys working directly in criminal public defenders’
offices and others based at nonprofits.46
We contribute to this growing literature and growing movement with a
complementary approach that stresses access to nonappointed counsel,
acknowledging that few immigrants currently have access to appointed
counsel. Although we concentrate on the immigration courts’ recent
prioritization of children’s and families’ cases, which reduced access to
counsel for a particularly vulnerable population, our argument holds equally
for adult respondents, who may be competent to represent themselves under
the current doctrine, but nonetheless possess a right to reasonable access to
counsel—and therefore to a reasonable continuance.
Our work fits within a broader literature on access to counsel in civil
cases. Scholars have examined these issues across many contexts,
including housing court, family court, and benefits adjudications.47 We add
to this literature with a focus on one of the most important reasons that
immigrants face their hearings without a lawyer: lack of time to save up for
and find one.
B. The Statutory Right to Counsel
The INA provides immigrants the right to counsel at no expense to the
government.48 That right is also guaranteed by regulations issued pursuant
to the statute.49
The regulations also include provisions to allow respondents time to seek
counsel. When a respondent moves for a continuance, the IJ may grant the
motion for good cause shown.50 Absent a formal motion for a continuance,
the IJ may also adjourn the hearing to a later date “either at his or her own
instance or, for good cause shown, upon application by the respondent or
the [Immigration and Naturalization Service].”51
In In re C-B-,52 the BIA held that when the respondent does not expressly
waive his or her right to counsel, these statutory and regulatory authorities
require the IJ to “grant a reasonable and realistic period of time to provide a
fair opportunity for a respondent to seek, speak with, and retain counsel.”53
In other words, the BIA has recognized that the statute and regulations give
rise to an obligation not only to grant an adjournment or continuance upon
good cause shown, but also to set a date that provides the respondent with a
fair opportunity to retain counsel.

46. See id.
47. For a review of the literature, see Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to
Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 40–44 (2010).
48. INA §§ 240(b)(4)(A), 292, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2012).
49. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.16(b), 1240.3, 1240.11(c)(1)(iii) (2015).
50. Id. § 1003.29.
51. Id. § 1240.6.
52. 25 I. & N. Dec. 888 (B.I.A. 2012).
53. Id. at 889.
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In re C-B-’s holding has not yet been cited by any court of appeals. That
neglect partly reflects the fact that very few unrepresented respondents
petition for review; the respondent in In re C-B- proceeded pro se.54 By
contrast, many of the circuit court cases on continuances have arisen after
an IJ denied a represented respondent’s right to a continuance. Even where
the circuit courts have expressly considered the denial of a continuance to
seek counsel, most of the cases concern a respondent’s right to a
continuance after their lawyers withdraw. In other words, the appellate case
law has arisen in the context of a privileged and unrepresentative subset of
all respondents who are denied continuances. The analysis we provide, and
the framework we suggest, is necessary because the courts of appeals rarely
(if ever) have the opportunity to consider this issue despite its importance
for most indigent immigrants in removal proceedings.
As a threshold matter, the general review of a denial of a continuance
should not be confused with the more specific review of a continuance to
seek counsel. For example, Peng v. Holder55 appeared to set out a standard
governing the review of the denial of a continuance. In Peng, the Ninth
Circuit held that the IJ “should consider factors including ‘(1) the nature of
the evidence excluded as a result of the denial of the continuance, (2) the
reasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3) the inconvenience to the
court, and (4) the number of continuances previously granted.’”56
Yet the court applied this standard where a represented respondent was
denied a continuance—the plaintiff in Peng needed time to apply for a
section 212(c) waiver.57 Moreover, the cases on which the Peng court
relied all concerned represented respondents who requested continuances
for one reason or another.58
By contrast, courts correctly employ a different standard to decide
whether the denial of a continuance specifically violated a respondent’s
right to counsel. The courts of appeals simultaneously consider whether the
denial of the continuance violated the respondent’s statutory right to
counsel and whether the denial constituted a due process violation.59 In
deciding whether a particular denial violated the right to counsel, courts
exercise substantial discretion. When courts affirm the denial, they often
emphasize the IJ’s discretionary control of his or her docket;60 when they

54. Id. at 888.
55. 673 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
56. Id. at 1253 (quoting Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009)).
57. Id. at 1253–57.
58. Id. at 1253; see Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 1011–12 (reviewing a denial of a continuance
requested by counsel while the appeal of the visa petition was pending); Baires v. INS, 856
F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing a denial of a continuance to gather more written
evidence); see also Karapetyan v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing
a denial of a continuance to submit fingerprints).
59. See Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 374 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he two claims
are one and the same.”).
60. See Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that an IJ’s
discretion to manage his or her docket is “wide,” and affirming a denial of a continuance
where the respondent’s lawyer withdrew and the respondent waived his right to counsel).
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reverse, they emphasize the right to counsel.61 One may search in vain for
a clear test governing when the denial of a continuance becomes
unreasonable enough to require reversal.
Perhaps more important than the test (or lack of one), however, are the
standard of review and the requirement that respondents show that they
were prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. The circuits are split on
both of these questions. In the Ninth Circuit, the denial of a continuance to
seek counsel presents a question of law that the court reviews de novo.62 In
the Third Circuit, by contrast, the court reviews a noncitizen’s challenge of
an IJ’s denial of a continuance to seek counsel for abuse of discretion.63
Moreover, the circuits are split on whether a respondent must show
prejudice to challenge a violation of his or her right to counsel. The
petitioner must show prejudice in the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, but
not in the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits.64 This split
reflects a broader split on the question of when courts may reverse agency
action in the absence of a showing of prejudice. In Leslie v. Attorney
General of the United States,65 for example, the Third Circuit held that
when a regulation protects a fundamental statutory or constitutional right, a
court may reverse agency failure to comply with the regulation even if there
is no showing of prejudice.66 Leslie concerned an IJ’s failure to comply
with the regulation requiring IJs to advise respondents that free legal
services may be available and to provide a list of such services.67 The court
granted the petition for review.68 The Ninth Circuit recently applied this
reasoning in reversing an IJ’s denial of a continuance for a respondent
whose attorney failed to appear: in Montes-Lopez v. Holder,69 the court
concluded both that the denial of the continuance violated the respondent’s
right to counsel and that no showing of prejudice was necessary for
reversal.70
This conclusion was also consistent with a line of older cases in which
the Ninth Circuit held that an IJ’s denial of a continuance violated the
statutory right to representation. In Castro-Nuno v. INS,71 the respondent’s
lawyer had appeared at two initial master calendar hearings, but the case
was continued to a third hearing because INS officers failed to appear.72 At
that third hearing, the respondent’s lawyer failed to appear.73 The
61. See Hernandez-Gil v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to
“allow a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness to render the right to counsel an empty
formality” (quoting Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005))).
62. Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2012).
63. Ponce-Leiva, 331 F.3d at 377.
64. See Montes-Lopez, 694 F.3d at 1090 (discussing the circuit split).
65. 611 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2010).
66. Id. at 180.
67. Id. at 173 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)–(3) (2015)).
68. Id. at 183.
69. 694 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012).
70. Id. at 1088–94.
71. 577 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1978).
72. Id. at 578.
73. Id.
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respondent repeatedly asked to speak with his lawyer, but the IJ ignored
these requests, conducted the hearing, and eventually allowed the
respondent to depart voluntarily from the United States.74 The Ninth
Circuit, relying on the statutory right to counsel in immigration proceedings
and the fact that the respondent did not waive that right, held that the IJ
should have granted a continuance sua sponte.75 Similarly, in Rios-Berrios
v. INS,76 the court relied partly on case law from the criminal context to
conclude that two continuances of one working day each deprived the
respondent of his statutory right to counsel.77 The court held that the
brevity of the continuances, particularly after the INS’s decision to transfer
the respondent from California to Florida, constituted an abuse of discretion
and violated both the respondent’s statutory right to counsel and the
underlying due process right that the statutory right codifies.78
In sum, the circuits are split on two questions: (1) whether to review the
denial of a continuance to seek counsel de novo or for abuse of discretion,
and (2) whether a petitioner must demonstrate prejudice to obtain reversal
of that denial. Notably absent from the case law is any treatment of the
length of continuances, rather than their denial. This varying and
incomplete treatment of continuance length demonstrates the need for a
rational framework that explicitly acknowledges the practical importance of
time between hearings.
C. A Due Process Framework for Continuance Length
The standard due process framework should make the consideration of
empirical evidence a natural part of determining whether procedures are
constitutionally sufficient. The Executive and the courts should consider
the effect of continuance length on access to counsel in weighing how much
time is constitutionally adequate. Although our direct reliance on
quantitative evidence may appear novel, it does not break new doctrinal
ground: empirical judgments are crucial to both the Mathews v. Eldridge
due process standard and the fundamental fairness due process standard,
which developed in the immigration context.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 579. An IJ’s duty to grant reasonable requests for continuances could also
spring from his or her statutory and ethical obligation to develop the record and guide the
respondent through his or her proceedings. In Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461 (8th Cir.
2004), the court affirmed the IJ’s denial of a continuance after the respondent’s lawyer
withdrew, but found that the IJ failed to give the respondent a full opportunity to develop the
record and therefore violated his due process rights—partly because the respondent lacked
time to prepare after his request for a continuance was denied. Id. at 464–66. An IJ’s
affirmative duty to develop the record stems partly from the INA. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(1) (2012) (“The immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.”).
76. 776 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1985).
77. See id. at 862–63.
78. Id.
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In Mathews, the Court set out a standard for determining whether
procedures are sufficient to pass constitutional due process muster. That
standard requires weighing
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.79

Our evidence, which demonstrates that longer continuances increase the
chance that respondents will find counsel, speaks directly to the second
factor: the value that a longer continuance (the procedural safeguard)
provides is the higher chance of finding a lawyer.
Of course, quantifying this value, as we have done, does not eliminate the
need to weigh the private interest in additional procedure against the
government’s interest in faster proceedings. Yet the private interest in
representation in immigration court is a particularly strong one, and the
government interest in shorter continuances is not. Although backlog and
delay in immigration court are real problems, the most important factor in
delay is the difficulty of scheduling an individual merits hearing: in some
courts, such hearings are now being scheduled already for 2019.80
The fundamental fairness test, historically applicable in the immigration
context, draws on principles similar to those that underpin the Mathews test.
To reverse on fundamental fairness grounds, a court of appeals must find a
fundamental procedural error, as well as prejudice resulting from that
error.81 Although we argue below that a finding of prejudice should not be
necessary for the reversal of a denial of a continuance, the prejudice
requirement reflects concerns similar to those underlying the Mathews test:
courts attempt to estimate the importance of the procedures at hand.
To evaluate whether short continuances violate due process, courts
should look to the aggregate evidence of harm rather than to prejudice in
any individual case. The reason is simple: the prejudice determination
requires a court to assemble a hypothetical counterfactual. The court is
forced to guess what would have happened in the case had the IJ granted a
longer continuance. In any individual case, that is nearly impossible—even
setting aside the fact that immigrants granted short continuances are
unlikely to appeal, and therefore such cases are necessarily rare. Imagine
(plausibly) a child who has no connections in the United States and was the
victim of abuse in Central America that he or she is afraid to discuss in
court. Imagine further that he or she receives a very short continuance, and
without a lawyer to gain the child’s trust and elicit his or her story, that
abuse remains absent from the record. In the unlikely event that the child
were to appeal, the BIA would have little choice but to conclude that the
79. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
80. We noted this timing in December 2015.
81. See Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 465–66 (8th Cir. 2004).
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short continuance caused little prejudice; the record would contain no facts
suggesting that the child was entitled to asylum.
This type of counterfactual determination asks the impossible of
appellate adjudicators, but it is precisely what quantitative causal inference
can accomplish in the aggregate.82 We therefore propose a regulation that
draws on these empirical results, but in the absence of such a rule, we urge
courts of appeals to consider our results when weighing the importance of
continuance length.
III. MORE SEARCHING REVIEW AND A
PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT TO A NINETY-DAY CONTINUANCE
More time means a better chance of finding a lawyer and remaining in
the United States. Drawing on these empirical results, which we believe fit
naturally into due process doctrine, we conclude with recommendations for
both the courts of appeals and EOIR, which supervises the country’s
immigration courts.
We argue, first, that the denial of a continuance to seek representation
should be reviewed de novo, as the denial itself makes review so much less
likely—by diminishing the respondent’s chance of finding a lawyer and
eventually appealing. When an IJ denies a continuance, that IJ not only
makes the immigrant less likely to find a lawyer and to avoid deportation,
but also makes the immigrant less likely to appeal a deportation order.83
Indeed, our case search did not yield a single example of an immigrant who
was denied a continuance and petitioned for review of that denial pro se.
Because the denial of a continuance is so unlikely to be reviewed, we think
it unfair to further insulate the denial from review by deferring to the
judgment of the IJ.
Similarly, the prejudice requirement is unfair in light of the empirical
evidence that shorter continuances systematically prevent pro se
respondents from finding counsel. An individual showing of prejudice
imposes a perverse burden upon a pro se litigant: it requires him or her to
marshal, on appeal, the evidence that his or her lawyer would have obtained
had the continuance been granted.84 The requirement places the respondent
in a catch-22: without a lawyer, the respondent cannot show what evidence
the lawyer would have marshaled.
Finally, perhaps the most notable shortcoming of the existing case law is
its failure to address the length of continuances. Our empirical findings
show that continuance length has a dramatic impact on the right to
counsel.85 Relying on our finding that the impact of a longer continuance is
large for continuances of under ninety days, we propose a presumption:
continuances of under ninety days for nondetained immigrants should be
82. Of course, our study is not a randomized controlled trial. Yet our attempt does take
advantage of the arbitrary nature of first continuance lengths, together with judge-fixed
effects, to draw plausible causal inferences.
83. See Hausman, supra note 33, at 24–25.
84. See supra Part II.C.
85. See supra Figure 3.
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presumptively invalid. The burden should be on the government to justify a
shorter continuance.
Of course, our findings cover only one population—families and
children—in one recent time period. We readily acknowledge that access to
counsel varies across courts and over time. We therefore suggest that EOIR
perform an analysis similar to the one we have performed, but for each
immigration court on an annual basis. This is feasible: EOIR already
publishes a statistical yearbook with descriptive statistics broken down by
court.86 A court-by-court analysis of continuance length and access to
counsel would allow a regionally sensitive presumption. EOIR may
implement a rule requiring such review—and a ninety-day presumption—
either through instruction to the country’s immigration courts or by a formal
rulemaking process.
These proposals, which would require minimal resources, would
significantly increase immigrants’ chances of finding a lawyer, helping to
make the right to counsel a reality.
CONCLUSION
Our findings and recommendations are simple. Time matters to
immigrants facing deportation, who are learning to navigate the
immigration courts and scraping together money for a lawyer. Setting a
presumptive minimum continuance length can begin to remedy the due
process violation that short continuances impose.

86. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at A5 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/
2014/04/16/fy13syb.pdf [perma.cc/98GX-WZ95].

